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Texas v. Johnson: The Constitutional Protection of
Flag Desecration

I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 22, 1984, an American flag was flying in front of the
Mercantile Bank building in Dallas, Texas. While Dallas was hosting
the Republican National Convention, Gregory Lee Johnson and fellow protesters were marching through the streets to challenge the
policies of the Reagan Administration.1 Along the way, they spray
painted buildings and staged "die-in's" to demonstrate the effect of a
nuclear explosion.2 When the protestors arrived at the Mercantile
Bank building, they bent down the flagpole and one of them removed
the American flag from its pole and handed it to Johnson. 3 The
march continued to the Dallas City Hall where Johnson burned the
flag while the protesters chanted "America, the -red, white, and blue,
we. spit on you." 4 The police arrived about thirty minutes later.
Johnson was arrested, charged, and eventually convicted 5 of violating
the Texas flag desecration statute.6 Daniel Walker, an employee of
the Army Corps of Engineers, was in the crowd that day and witnessed the flag's burning. Walker gathered up the charred remains
7
of the flag and quietly buried them in his backyard.
Johnson and Walker symbolically represent the competing interests in Texas v. Johnson.8 Johnson, supported by his attorney, William M. Kunstler, and the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus
curiae, represents the first amendment right of an individual to express his political beliefs. 9 Walker, by his silent reverence for the
flag, symbolizes the position advocated by the State of Texasl 0 and
1. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989); Brief for the State of Texas at 56, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (No. 88-155).
2. Brief for the State of Texas at 7, Johnson (No. 88-155).
3. Id. at 8.
4. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. at 2536.
5. Id, at 2537.
6. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (Vernon 1989). For the text of this
statute, see infra note 141.
7. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Brief for the State
of Texas at 11, Johnson (No. 88-155).
8. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); see inkfra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 38-97 and accompanying text.
10. See inifra note 150 and accompanying text.

the minority opinion of the United States Supreme Court.11 They believe that preserving the American flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity is a more compelling interest than an individual's
first amendment right to burn the flag in political protest. 12
Ultimately, Johnson and the first amendment won the day. 13 However, the Supreme Court was sharply divided in its five-to-four decision, highlighted by an apologetic explanation in a concurring opinion
by Justice Kennedy.14 Case law precedent indicated the clear path to
the Court's decision,15 and the Court's first amendment analysis
brought no surprises. 16 However, Texas v. Johnson is unique because
of the compelling nature of the state's interest. Rarely has an issue
so deeply touched the hearts of the American people who, like Justice Kennedy, are torn between the love of their country and their
desire for fundamental human rights.
This note is divided into five parts. Part I traces the history of the
flag desecration statutes. 17 Part II explores the first amendment and
the modern decisions establishing the strict standard of review employed by the majority in Johnson.18 Part III then provides a complete analysis of Johnson.19 The impact of the decision is discussed in
Part IV, with particular focus on the congressional and presidential
responses. 20 A brief conclusion and epilogue comprise Part V.21
II.
A.

FLAG DESECRATION: STATUTES AND CASE LAW

Early Statutes and Cases: 1890-1918
Although flag desecration statutes have been in existence since

1898,22 their association with first amendment issues is a modern phe11. See infra notes 190-229 and accompanying text.
12. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also infra
notes 150, 192, 216-23 and accompanying text.
13. Johnson, 109 S. Ct at 2548; see infra note 146.
14. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see inkfra notes 187-89
and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 98-138 and accompanying text.
16. G. Stone, Statement before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearings on the United States Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson 1
(Aug. 1, 1989). Stone, a Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law and Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, testified to the Senate Committee that the decision in
Johnson held no surprises because it was based on constitutional doctrines that had
been established over the last century. Id.
17. See irfra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 49-138 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 139-228 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 229-96 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 297-305 and accompanying text.
22. By 1906, more than half the states had enacted flag abuse statutes:
Ariz., Rev. Stat. 1901, p. 1295; Colo. 3 Mills Anno. Stat., vol. 3, Rev. Supp.,
1891-1905, p. 542; Conn., Gen. Stat., 1902, p. 387; Cal. Stat., 1899, p. 46; Del., 22
Sess. Laws, p. 982; Hawaii, Sess. Laws, 1905, -p. 20; Idaho, Sess. Laws, 1905, p.

Texas v. Johnson

[Vol. 17: 757, 1990]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

nomenon. 23 It took nearly three-quarters of a century for political

protesters to realize that the flag was a powerful means of expression, and just as long for notions of first amendment protection to expand enough to encompass such acts.
Early cases primarily involved improper commercial use of flags in
advertising and trademarks. 24
In Halter v. Nebraska,25 a 1906
landmark case, the United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a businessman accused of selling whiskey bottles with labels
displaying the American flag. 26 The Court ruled that an individual
cannot acquire property rights in the American flag, 27 and that the
use of the flag for commercial purposes "tends to degrade and
cheapen the flag in the estimation of the people, as well as to defeat
the object of maintaining it as an emblem of National power and National Honor." 28 After a few proceedings,29 flags were no longer seen
30
on commercial items, and flag misuse cases were not prevalent.
B. Statutes and Cases During World War I
With the fervor of patriotism accompanying World War I came the
next wave of flag statutes. Federal statutes made it a crime to cast
contempt, either by words or act, upon the United States flag. 3 '
328; Ill., Sess. Laws, 1899, p. 234; Ind., Acts, 1901, p. 351; Kans., Gen. Stat., 1905,
p. 499, § 2442; Me., R.S., 1903, p. 911; Md., Laws, 1902, p. 720; Mass., 2 Rev.
Laws, 1902, p. 1742; Mich., Pub. Acts, 1901, p. 139; Minn., Rev. Laws, 1905,
§ 5180; Mo., 2 Anno. Stat., 1906, § 2352; Mont., Laws, 1905, p. 143; N.H., Pub.
Stat., 1901, p. 810; N.J., Laws, 1904, p. 34; New Mex., Laws, 1903, p. 121; N.Y.,
Laws, 1905, vol. 1, p. 973; N. Dak., Laws, 1901, p. 103; R.I., Sess. Acts, Jan. &
Dec., 1902, p. 65; Utah, Laws, 1903, p. 29; Vt. Laws, 1898, p. 93; Washington,
Session Laws, 1901, p. 321; Wis., Laws, 1901, p. 173; Wyo., Laws, 1905, p. 86.
Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 39 n.1 (1906).
23. See Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration Statutes: History and Analysis, 93 WASH.
U.L.Q. 193, 201-02 (1972) (no mention of first amendment rights were made for many
years).
24. See, e.g., Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E. 41 (1900). Ruhstrat was found
guilty of displaying the national flag on a cigar box in violation of the Illinois flag statute. On appeal, the statute was held unconstitutional on the basis of the equal protection and due process clauses. Id. at 147-48, 57 N.E. at 46.
25. 205 U.S. 34 (1906).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 42-43.
28. Id. at 42.
29. See, e.g., Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1906); Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133,
57 N.E. 41 (1900); People ex rel. McPike v. Van DeCarr, 178 N.Y. 618, 70 N.E. 965

(1904).
30. Rosenblatt, supra note 23, at 205.
31. UNIFORM FLAG ACT OF 1917 § 3. The Act provides: "No person shall publicly
mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any

such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield."

PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE

While earlier cases were based on flag degradation through advertising, the World War I cases expanded the notion of degradation to include contemptuous language. 32 In Ex Parte Starr,33 the defendant
was sentenced to ten to twenty years of hard labor for saying, "What
is this thing anyway? Nothing but a piece of cotton with a little paint
on it and some other marks in the corner there. I will not kiss that
thing. It might be covered with microbes."3 4 As patriotic fever died
down with the armistice, so did the occurrence of flag desecration
cases. Consequently, there were no American flag cases between the
35
two world wars.
C. Statutes and Cases During World War II
During World War II, a resurgence of patriotism engendered more
litigation and stronger federal flag legislation. 36 In 1942, Congress
passed a national flag code with strict rules for the display and dispo37
sal of the flag, as well as procedures for the pledge of allegiance.
As the legislation became stricter during this era, the Court began to
consider the first amendment issues inherent in such legislation. For
38
example, In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
the Court upheld school children's right to refrain from pledging allegiance to the flag, ruling that the government cannot compel affirmative declarations. 39 The Barnette case involved children who
were Jehovah's Witnesses and were forbidden by their religion to
make such a pledge. 40 The children had been expelled from school
or threatened with exclusion, and their parents were subject to prosOF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWs 323-24 (1917), quoted in Texas v. John-

son, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2552.(1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
32. Rosenblatt, supra note 23, at 205-06.
33. 263 F. 145 (D. Mont. 1920).
34. Id.; see also State v. Shumaker, 103 Kan. 741, 175 P. 978 (1918). Shumaker was
convicted of using contemptuous language about the American flag in front of other
people. The court did not mention what Shumaker's words were, but described them
as vulgar:
Such language will not, cannot, be used by any man in any place concerning
our flag, if he has proper respect for it. The man who uses such language concerning it, either in jest or in argument, does not have that respect for it that
should be found in the breast of every citizen of the United States. Such language concerning our country's flag will not be used except for the purpose of
casting contempt upon it.
Id. at 742, 175 P. at 979.
35. Rosenblatt, supra note 23, at 206.
36. Id. at 206-07.
37. Joint Resolution to Codify and Emphasize Existing Rules and Customs Pertaining to the Display and Use of the Flag of the United States of America, 36 U.S.C.
§ 174 (1988).
38. 319 U.S. 629 (1943) (reversing Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940)).
39. Id. at 642.
40. Id. at 629.

[Vol. 17: 757, 1990]

Texas v. Johnson
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

ecution. 41 Although the Court relied on the first amendment,42 the
context was coercive legislation.43 The Court did not apply the first
amendment to legislation that prohibits affirmative political expression, thus leaving the doors open for the modern flag cases.
During the World War II era, courts also began to make the distinction between public and private disrespect for the flag. Public disrespect was a crime, while private disrespect was not. 44
D.

The Vietnam War Era

The most significant changes in the flag desecration cases came
with the political turbulence of the Vietnam War era.45 For the first
time, flag desecration was used as a method of protest, and was defended with claims of first amendment rights.4 6
Until 1967, it was left to the states to regulate flag desecration.
However, in response to increased incidents of flag burning and concern for the detrimental effect it had upon United States troops, Congress enacted the first national flag statute. 47 The modern cases,
which began in response to the Vietnam War, created the basis for
the constitutional issues raised in Texas v. Johnson. The next section
will set the first amendment constitutional stage and examine the
significant flag cases that arose during this era.48
III.
A.

FIRST AMENDMENT BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION TO
MODERN FLAG DESECRATION CASES

Symbolic Speech

The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech." 4 9 Courts have subsequently
41. Id. at 630.
42. Id. at 639.
43. Id. at 640, 642.
44. Compare State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 25 A.2d 491 (1942) (holding that a defendant pretending to tear and trample an American flag in his home in the presence
of another person commits a private action which is not prosecutable) with Johnson v.
State, 204 Ark. 476, 481, 163 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1942) (holding public verbal abuse, "it's
only a rag," a criminal act because it evinces contempt for the flag).
45. See infra notes 98-138 and accompanying text.
46. See irfra notes 104-14, 125-38 and accompanying text.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1979). The statute states that "[w]hoever knowingly casts
contempt upon any flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling,
burning or trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both." Id.
48. See infra notes 49-138 and accompanying text.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

construed "speech" to include conduct which is "sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication."50 Such conduct is called "symbolic speech,"sl and is afforded the same first amendment protection
52
as verbal speech.
The Supreme Court has recognized that conduct associated with
flag misuse is not always imbued with elements of communication
and, therefore, the Court must look to the context of the action to
determine if it is symbolic speech.53 The test for symbolic speech is
determined by the party's intent to convey a particularized message
through his actions. 54 In Spence v. Washington,55 for example, the
Court found that superimposing a large peace symbol on the United
States flag and displaying it upside down out of an apartment window
as a political protest was conduct that had communicative intent and
was thus symbolic speech. 56 Flag misuse cases that have dealt with
this issue, including Johnson, have held that such acts had communicative intent and were protected expression.5 7
B. Restricting Speech
Generally, first amendment issues are based on competing interests: an individual's right to freedom of speech versus a state's interest in regulating speech to promote some public good.58 An
assumption exists that the individual's rights are absolutely pro50. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
51. Symbolic speech includes: wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969);
sit-ins to protest segregation, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966); wearing
American military uniforms in a play protesting the Vietnam War, Schacht v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); picketing for causes, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
176 (1983), Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 390 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968); displaying a red flag to promote communist ideology,
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
52. See Brown, 383 U.S. at 142 (first amendment rights "are not confined to verbal
expression [but] embrace appropriate types of action").
53. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989).
54. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-411.
55. Id. at 405.
56. Id. at 415; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 588 (1974) (sewing small flag
on seat of pants); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)
(pledge of allegiance and saluting the flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 36869 (1931) (displaying a red flag).
57. See, e.g., Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540; Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
58. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961). The Konigsberg Court
stated:
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association ... as protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes' . . . [G]eneral regulatory statutes . . . have not been regarded as the type of law the First or
Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress to pass, when they have been
found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite
to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved.
Id. at 49-51.

[Vol. 17: 757, 1990]

Texas v. Johnson
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

tected,59 and the state must prove that its regulations are justified.60
In reconciling these competing interests, the Court first looks to the
kind of speech that the individual has employed. There are different
levels of protection depending upon the nature of the speech61 Certain speech, whether verbal or symbolic, receives a very limited level
of constitutional protection because of its negligible value.6 2 Examples of such speech include obscenity, 63 commercial speech,6 4 fighting
words,65 and child pornography.6 6 Additionally, the Court has slowly
developed well-recognized exceptions to the absoluteness of first
amendment guarantees. 6 7 For example, an individual is not free to
speak words which encourage crime,68 incite revolutionary action, 69
or expressly incite violence.70 Other exceptions include misrepresentation and false advertising,71 libel, 72 and undue pretrial publicity. 73
If the speech is not one of the unprotected or specially carved cate59. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987) (even
restricted speech occupies a position on the scale of first amendment values according
speech absolute protection).
60. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 317 (1988) (Court required the state to show that
its regulation was necessary to serve a state interest).
61. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 194 (1983). "[T]he Court begins with the presumption that the first amendment
protects all communication and then creates areas of nonprotection only after it affirmatively finds that a particular class of speech does not sufficiently further the underlying purposes of the first amendment." Id.; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 23, at
219 ("[W]here there is expression combined with some act that is disruptive of public
order, the first amendment will not be inducted into service.").
62. Stone, supra note 61, at 194 (certain speech has "low" first amendment value,
thus entitling it to only limited constitutional protection).
63. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (obscenity is unprotected speech);
see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
64. Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech is afforded limited constitutional protection); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
65. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (fighting words that
are inherently likely to provoke retaliation can be restricted by the state).
66. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (distributors of child pornography are not protected by the first amendment.)
67. Rosenblatt, supra note 23, at 218.
68. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
69. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
70. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (expression that is directed at inciting
imminent lawless action and is likely to cause such action can be regulated by the
state); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544-46 (1951).
71. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961).
72. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 488 (1964) (defamation of public officials is given a high level of protection); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
73. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).

gories which carry their own analytical guidelines, the Court will
then turn to the statute to determine the validity of the governmental interest. The Court must decide whether the statute is "contentbased"74 or "content-neutral"75 in order to determine the proper test
to use in analyzing the competing interests.
1.

Content-Based Statutes

The first amendment protects the individual against suppression of
free expression. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 76 If a law expressly restricts the communication of a particular message or expressly restricts speech because of others' reactions to the content of
the message, it is related to the suppression of free expression. 77
Such laws are "content-based."
Content-based statutes limit communication on the basis of the
message conveyed by the individual.78 If the statute's purpose in regulating speech is to impede the communicative impact of the expression, it is content-based. 79 For example, a law that forbids individuals
from carrying signs in the Senate gallery criticizing a member of the
Senate is content-based because it expressly restricts the communication of a particular message-the criticism of Senators.80 Another
example is a law that forbids individuals from carrying signs in the
Senate gallery that would offend members of the Senate. Even
though this law does not restrict a particular message, it is nevertheless content-based because its application will depend upon the reaction of others to the message expressed.81 Other examples of
content-based restrictions include laws prohibiting seditious libel,
banning the publication of secret information, forbidding the employment of teachers who advocate violent overthrow of the government,
or outlawing the exhibition of the swastika in certain
neighborhoods.82
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
G. Stone, supra note 16, at 3.
See Stone, supra note 59, at 47.

79. See Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1497 (1975); Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 116 (1981).
"The critical question would therefore seem to be whether the harm that the state is
seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating,
and more particularly out of the way people can be expected to react to his message
.... Ely, supra,
.
at 1497.

80. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 4.
81. Id.
82. See Stone, supra note 59, at 47.
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If the Court finds that the statute is content-based, the state must
meet a stringent compelling state interest test. 83 To meet this test,
the state must show that a compelling governmental interest justifies
the restriction.8 4 As a result of the Court's concern for protecting the
individual against the suppression of free expression, almost every
content-based statute over the last twenty-five years has been found
unconstitutional under this test.8 5 The Court is concerned that if the
government is permitted to restrict only some messages and not
others, it can distort the content of public debate and destroy the
thought processes of the community.8 6 Therefore, such laws are presumptively unconstitutional. 87
2.

Content-Neutral Statutes

Statutes that limit expression without regard for the expression's
communicative impact or content are content-neutral. 88 For example, a law forbidding an individual from carrying a sign in the Senate
gallery which blocks the view of spectators is not related to the suppression of free speech because it is not. directed at speech. It applies
"without regard to the content of any particular message." 8 9 Other
examples of content-neutral restrictions include laws restricting loud
speeches near a hospital, banning billboards in residential communi83. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (requiring the state to prove that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); accord Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
84. See Stone, supra note 59, at 48.
85. Stone, supra note 61, at 196. But see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
While most content-based statutes could not withstand the compelling state interest
test, the Court has occasionally upheld such statutes. These exceptions seem to fit
within two categories: (1) laws that distinguish on the basis of subject matter, and (2)
laws that arise in special settings (e.g., prisons and military bases). Stone, supra note
61, at 196 n.28; see, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977) (upholding validity of prison regulations); Young v. American Mini-Theatres,
427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding restrictions on geographic location of
sexually explicit speech); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (permitting statutes regulating military bases); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (restrictions on all political advertising on public transportation is constitutional).
86. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 4.
87. Id.
88. See Stone, supra note 59, at 48; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988)
(content-neutral speech restrictions are those that are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
89. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 4.

ties, limiting campaign contributions, and prohibiting the destruction
of draft cards. 90
Because content-neutral laws are unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, they are less likely to harm the thought processes of
the community and affect the substantive content of public debate.9 '
For this reason, the Court permits a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating speech to justify some limitations on
first amendment rights.92 In determining how important the governmental interest must be, the Court has applied various tests to content-neutral statutes. 93
One such test is the balancing test
formulated in United States v. OBrien.94 The balancing test is much
90. Stone, supra note 59, at 48; see also Ely, supra note 79, at 1498. Professor Ely
suggests a possible guide for determining if a statute is based on communicative impact: "Had [the] audience been unable to read English, [would there] have been no occasion for the regulation?" Id.
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
92. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989).
93. See Stone, supra note 59, at 49. In his survey of the Court's rulings on contentneutral statutes, Professor Stone has formulated a list of seven distinct standards of
review. The Court has upheld all of the statutes examined on the basis of the first
four standards. However, the outcomes of statutes examined on the basis of standards
five through seven, a stricter review, were varied. Id. at 48-54. The seven standards
are:
1. Some content-neutral restrictions do not even "implicate" first amendment
concerns [quoting Acara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986)].
2. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are "reasonable" [quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greensburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
131 n.7 (1981)].
3. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if "they are designed to
serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication" [quoting City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (the time, place, and manner test)].
4. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional, if they are "within the
constitutional power of the Government"; they further "an important or
substantial governmental interest," the governmental interest is "unrelated
to the suppression of free expression," and the restriction is "no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest" [quoting United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (the balancing test)].
5. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional depending upon the
Court's resolution of "the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances" and appraising "the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation" [quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939)].
6. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they serve "sufficiently strong, subordinating" interests by means of "narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering
with the First Amendment freedoms" [quoting Schaumberg v. Citizens for
a Better Env't., 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980)].
7. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest" and are "narrowly tailored to
serve that interest" [quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)].
Id. at 48-50 & nn.7-13.
94. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Professor Stone's fourth formulation is the O'Brien balancing test. See supra note 93; see also Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540 (discussing balancing
test).
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more lenient than the compelling state interest test, which is applied
to content-based laws. The balancing test provides that a statute is
constitutional if it is (1) unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (2) the restriction is no greater than necessary to further an
important governmental interest. 95
Although the balancing test requires the pertinent governmental
interest to be important, the Court, in recent cases, has not seriously
examined whether that interest is substantial; nor has it explored
less intrusive means by which the government could achieve its
goals. 96 Because of this lenient level of scrutiny, the trend of the
Court has been to find content-neutral statutes constitutional under
this test.97 In sum, for a statute to successfully withstand a constitutional challenge, it almost certainly would have to be content-neutral
and judged by the O'Brien balancing test.
C. Flag Desecration Cases
1. Street v. New York

98

During the height of the civil rights movement, Sidney Street
learned that civil rights leader James Meredith had been shot.99 Distraught by the news, Street took his flag to the street corner and
95. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82. The O'Brien Court upheld a federal statute
which forbids a person from knowingly destroying or mutilating a draft card. Id. at
386. O'Brien was convicted of publicly burning his draft card as a symbolic act of political protest. Id. at 369. The Court ruled that the federal statute was designed to promote the smooth and proper functioning of the draft system, and was not designed to
suppress free speech. Id. at 381. As such, it was held content-neutral. The Court applied the balancing test, holding that the regulation was not greater than necessary to
further the government's interest in running the draft system. Id at 381-82.
Professor Ely observed that the "selective service records ... would have been
equally threatened had O'Brien's destruction of his draft card totally lacked communicative significance." Ely, supra note 79, at 1498.
96. See Stone, supra note 59, at 50-51. One possible reason why the Court is more
lenient with content-neutral statutes is that the first amendment is primarily concerned with (1) governmental distortion of public debate, (2) improper governmental
motivation in restricting speech because the government disapproves of a particular
message, and (3) concern that the government will restrict speech on the basis of how
people will react to what the speaker is saying. Id. at 54-57. These concerns arise more
frequently in content-based statutes than in content-neutral laws. Id. at 57.
97. Id. at 52 n.23. The Court has applied the O'Brien balancing test to only five
content-neutral statutes and each was upheld. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.
675 (1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367.
98. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
99. 1d at 578.

burned it while saying, "We don't need no damn flag." 00 Later, he
admitted to police, "Yes; that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that
happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag."10 1 Street was
convicted of violating a New York statute which makes it a misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or
cast contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United
States]."102
Street differs from other flag cases because the statute prohibited
casting contempt upon the flag by words as well as by acts. 103 Persuaded that Street could have been convicted for his words alone,
which would be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction. 104 Because the lower court did not specify whether Street
also was convicted of the physical act of publicly mutilating the flag,
the Supreme Court held that "Street's words could have been an independent cause of his conviction and . . .a conviction for uttering

such words would violate the Constitution.' 0 5 The dissent was frustrated by the Court's refusal to decide the more controversial issue of
the constitutionality of a flag desecration statute in a flag burning
context. 10 6 That issue waited twenty years to be addressed.107
In Street, the Court first examined whether Street's words fell into
a category of speech afforded a lower level of protection. 0 8 The
Court found that Street's words did not come under the class of
speech which might incite others to commit unlawful acts' 09 because
"[a]ppellant's words, taken alone, did not urge anyone to do anything
unlawful." 110 The Court also found that Street did not use fighting
words that would provoke violent retaliation because his words were
not inherently inflammatory."' Turning to the applicable New York
statute, the Court held that it promoted the state's interest in protecting the sensibilities of passers-by who are likely to be shocked by
the appellant's words and thus was content-based." 2 Additionally,
100. Id. at 579.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 578 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425(16)(d) (McKinney 1909), superseded
by N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(d) (McKinney 1965)).
103. See infra notes 116, 117, 139 and accompanying text.
104. Street, 394 U.S'. at 586-87.
105. Id. at 585.
106. Id. at 595 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
107. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
108. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
109. Street, 394 U.S. at 591.
110. Id
111. Id. at 592; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 74 (1942) (holding
that calling a person a "damn racketeer" or a "damn fascist" is not likely to provoke a
person to retaliate and thereby breach the peace).
112. Street, 394 U.S. at 592; see supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text. A Court's
finding that, a statute is content-based is tantamount to finding the statute
unconstitutional.
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the state's interest in assuring that citizens show respect for the national symbol was dismissed because "no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
113
their faith therein."
Although Street was decided solely on the basis of the appellant's
words, and not on his acts, the Court expressly reserved the broader
question of whether a future defendant could be constitutionally con114
victed for burning a flag.
.2.

Smith v. Goguen

Smith v. Goguen' 15 arose at a time when long hair and worn blue
jeans were the uniform of the young. Goguen was arrested for wearing a small flag sewn on the seat Of his pants, in violation of a Massachusetts flag desecration statute.1 1 6 Unlike Street and Johnson, this
case involved no breach of the peace, no physical act of desecration,
and no political protest.1 17 Goguen's conviction was based on the
clause in the statute making it a misdemeanor to treat the flag
contemptuously.11s
The Court did not address the first amendment issue in this case,
but turned instead to the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. The Court voided the Massachusetts statute, which prohibited treating the American flag "contemptuously,"11 9 stating that the
statute was too vague1 20 and failed to draw reasonably clear lines be113. Street, 394 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added) (citing West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (holding that school children cannot be coerced to
pledge allegiance to the flag)).
114. Id. at 581; see also Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2554 (1989) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
115. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5 (West 1970).
117. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 568.
118. Id. at 569 n.3; see infra note 119 for text of the Massachusetts flag desecration
statute.
119. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5. The relevant part of the statute reads:
Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously
the flag of the United States . . . whether such flag is public or private property ... shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than one
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both ....
Id. (emphasis added).
120. The "vagueness doctrine" stands for the notion that no statute which punishes
conduct can survive if it cannot be understood and obeyed. See Rosenblatt, supra note
23, at 227; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844
(1970); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-97 (1979); Grayned v.

tween criminal and noncriminal treatment of the flag. The Court
also stated that due process requires that "all 'be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids.'"121 The Court was concerned that
the standardless language found in the Massachusetts statute would
allow law enforcement officers, judges, and juries to make decisions
12 2
on the basis of their own predilections.
Although the Goguen Court did not address the first amendment
issues later analyzed in Johnson, it did leave open the possibility of
the constitutionality of a statute that defines the forbidden treatment
of the American flag with substantial specificity. As in Street, the
123
Court in Goguen expressly reserved that decision for a future case.
2
3. Spence v. Washington1 4

Spence is a political protest case, as are Street and Johnson. Appellant Spence symbolically125 expressed his anguish about the domestic
and foreign affairs of the government, particularly the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy.l26 He did so by flying his own
American flag upside down out of his own window with a peace sym127
bol, made of removable black tape, affixed to both sides of the flag.
Police came to Spence's home and arrested him for violating a Washington State statute prohibiting persons from placing any design or
picture on the American flag and thereafter exposing it to the
8
public.12
Spence differs from previous flag desecration cases because Spence
was prosecuted under an "improper use" statute rather than a flag
desecration statute.129 However, this did not create differing analyCity of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
121. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574 (quoting Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453).
122. Id. at 575.
123. Id. at 581-82.
124. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
125. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text discussing symbolic speech.
126. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.

127. Id. at 406.
128. Id. at 406-07. Spence was charged under the state's "improper use" statute.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.86.020 (West 1988). The statute provides in part:
No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display: (1) Place or cause
to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement

of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of the United
States or of this state ... or (2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard,
color ensign or shield upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement

Id.
129. Theoretically, improper use statutes might be considered content-neutral because they do not prohibit certain messages from being expressed-Spence could have
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ses. In fact, the first part of the Court's ruling in Spence paralleled
its reasoning in Street when the Court invalidated Washington State's
interests in: (1) preventing a breach of the peace; (2) protecting the
sensibilities of passers-by; and (3) punishing failure to show proper
respect for the flag. 130 However, the Court proceeded to examine an
additional governmental interest not raised in Street that was to become a crucial issue in Johnson: the preservation of the flag as a national symbol.131 The Court in Spence, declining to decide the case
on this basis, relegated the discussion to dicta.132 Nevertheless, it is
illustrative in light of the future Johnson decision.
The Spence Court, in dicta, recognized that the flag carries a variety of messages to different people, 133 implying that it is not the government's function to impose and enforce its own viewpoint on its
citizens. In addition, the Court hypothesized that if such a state interest were valid, the purpose of the statute would be directly related
to expression (i.e., content-based) and, therefore, the O'Brien balancing test 13 4 would be inapplicable, 135 virtually rendering the statute
unconstitutional.136 As will be discussed, this is precisely the reasoning used in the Johnson decision.13 7 However, the Spence Court settled, instead, on a finding that the state had no interest in preserving
the physical integrity of a privately owned flag, thus invalidating the
38
conviction.
Street, Goguen, and Spence set the stage for the Johnson decision,
superimposed anything on the flag and still have violated the statute. However,
although the state does not care what message the defendant is conveying when he
misuses the flag, it is concerned that the defendant is interfering with the message
conveyed by the flag itself, and indirectly this might be a content-based statute. See
generally Ely, supra note 79, at 1503-08. "[A]lthough improper use statutes do not single out certain messages for proscription, they do single out one set of messages,
namely the set of messages conveyed by the American flag, for protection." Id. at 1506
(emphasis in original). The Spence Court, however, did not directly address the question of whether the statute was content-based or content-neutral.
130. Spence, 418 U.S. at 412; see also supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
The fact that the Spence Court was addressing expressive actions instead of words did
not affect the similarity of analysis between Spence and Street because symbolic speech
and verbal speech are given identical protection.

131. Compare Spence, 418 U.S. at 412-13 with Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533,
2543-57 (1989) (illustrating additional interests not previously addressed by the Court).

132. Spence, 418 U.S. at 413-14.
133. Id. at 413 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33
(1943) ("[W]hat is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn.")).
134. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
135. Spence, 418 U.S. at 414 n.8.
136. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
138. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.

each contributing to the issues that culminated in that case. By viewing Johnson in the wake of these background cases, the ultimate
findings are far more predictable.
IV.

TEXAS V. JOHNSON

Facts of the Case and ProceduralHistory

A.

During his participation in a political demonstration, Gregory Lee
13 9
Johnson doused an American flag with kerosene and set it on fire.
No one present was physically injured, but several onlookers said
that they had been seriously offended by the flag burning. 140 The actual flag burning and the serious offense it caused were sufficient to
violate section 42.09(a)(3) of the Texas Penal Code.141 Johnson was
convicted under the statute, sentenced to one year in prison, and
fined $2,000.142 The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District of Texas, 143 but was reversed by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals,

14 4

which held that the State could not

punish Johnson for burning the flag under the circumstances
presented.145 The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
46

decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.1
Analysis of the Case

B.
1.

Majority Opinion

The crucial question in any first amendment case is the standard of
review. Will the state statute be deemed content-based or contentneutral? Will the state win the coveted O'Brien balancing test or

struggle with, and probably lose, the compelling state interest test?
139. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989); see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
140. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537.
141. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989). This statute provides:
S 42.09. Desecration of Venerated Object
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id.
142. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537.
143. Johnson v. State, 706 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 755 S.W.2d 92
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
144. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff1d, 109 S. Ct. 2533
(1989).
145. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing Johnson, 755 S.W.2d at 97-98).
146. Id. at 2548.
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Justice Brennan, writing for the five Justice majority in Johnson,147
established that Johnson's act was "symbolic speech," 148 and then addressed the central question of which test to apply. Finding the
Texas statute content-based,4 9 the Court applied a compelling state
interest standard of review. Once the standard of review was established, the rest of the decision followed predictably: the state's interests simply were not compelling enough to overcome Johnson's first
amendment protection.
a.

The Content-Based/Content-Neutral Analysis

To determine whether the Texas, statute was content-based, the
Court examined the interests of the state and the purpose of the statute. The State of Texas asserted that its statute was intended to protect two state interests: (1) preventing a breach of .the peace, and (2)
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood andnational unity. 5 0
(1)

Preventing a Breach of the Peace

The majority held that preventing a breach of the peace was not
implicated in the facts of the case because no actual violence occurred.1 5 ' Therefore, the Court did not consider this concern in its
content analysis.
Although the Court dismissed this interest, it continued to discuss
other arguments pertaining to it.152 The Court observed that not all
disputes necessarily lead to a breach of the peace.' 53 Although
speech which is likely to incite violence is not protected by the first
147. Justice Brennan is joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia and
Kennedy.
148. Id. at 2540. "Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct 'sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication' to implicate the First Amendment." Id. (quoting
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
149. Id. at 2543 ("Johnson's political expression was restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed.").
150. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541-42.
151. Id. at 2541. But see Brief for the State of Texas at 33-40, Johnson (No. 88-155).
The state argued that the requirement of an actual breach of the peace does not take
into account the prophylactic purpose of the statute, and urges that the Court require,
instead, a clear and present danger of potential breach of peace. "The state's interest
in regulating an act of flagburning is not punishment of a breach of the peace, but
rather prevention of a breach of the peace." Id. at 33. The state asserted that by requiring the stricter "actual violence" standard, the Court would encourage violence by
people who wish to see the desecrators punished-a heckler's veto concept. Id. at 3940.
152. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541.
153. Id.

amendment, a governmental assumption that "every expression of a
provocative idea will incite a riot"' 54 would mean that anything provocative could be suppressed.155 The Court concluded that an unpopular idea does not always mean that it is directed toward, or likely to
produce, imminent lawless action. 156 Furthermore, a dispute is not
something to be shunned for fear that a breach of the peace will occur. In fact, an inherent aspect of free speech is that it actually invites dispute. 157 Finally, the Court noted that Texas already had a
law prohibiting breaches of the peace, thus enabling Texas to prevent
such breaches without punishing an individual specifically for flag
desecration.158
(2)

Preserving the American Flag as a Symbol of Nationhood
and National Unity

The majority found that the interest of preserving the American
flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity was contentbased,159 and offered two reasons for its finding. First, the statute's
"serious offense" language is contingent upon the communicative impact of the act.16 0 The statute only applies to a flagburner who
knows that he will seriously offend someone likely to observe or discover his action.161 It is improbable that an observer would be seriously offended by the sole act of burning any flag, such as burning an
154. Id. at 2542.
155. Id.
156. Id. The Court also held that Johnson did not breach the peace by using "fighting words" that are likely to provoke the average person to retaliate, because Johnson's generalized expression of protest was not directed as a personal insult to anyone
in the crowd, nor did he invite anyone to "exchange fisticuffs." Id. at 2542. But see id.
at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (the public burning of the flag by Johnson was so
inherently inflammatory that it had a tendency to incite a breach of the peace).
157. Id. at 2541. "[A] principal function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger." Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)); see also
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611, 615 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508-09 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965).
158. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542 (referring to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01
(Vernon 1989)). The majority's argument is reminiscent of the "less restrictive alternative" clause in the O'Brien balancing test, thus giving the impression that the Court
is applying the balancing test to this isolated issue in order to determine whether the
balancing test should be applied to the entire case.
159. Id. at 2543. "We are.., persuaded that this [government] interest is related to
expression in the case of Johnson's burning of the flag ...and thus [is] related 'to the
suppression of free expression'...." Id. at 2542 (quoting O'Brien, 301 U.S. at 377).
160. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989) provides in pertinent part: "(b)
for purposes of this section, desecrate means deface, damage, or otherwise physically
mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely
to observe or discover this action." Id. (emphasis added).
161. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
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old flag as a means of disposal.162 Rather, an observer would be offended only if the flag desecration were coupled with a disparaging
message concerning the flag. Thus, there is an implication that Johnson was not prosecuted for the expression of just any idea; he was
prosecuted for the offensive political views symbolically expressed in
163
his act.
Also, the state's concern that flag burning will lead people to believe that the flag does not stand for nationhood and national unity
can only arise when the perpetrator's treatment of the flag communi164
cates a message that the flag stands for less positive concepts.
Thus, the concern is intrinsically related to the message of the ex165
pression, and is content-based.
b.

The Application of the Compelling State Interest Test

Once the Court eliminated the balancing test of the content-neutral standard and held that the statute was content-based, the majority proceeded to apply the compelling state interest test.166 This test
167
subjects the content-based statute to a "most exacting scrutiny."
The state regulation must be "[1] necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and... [2] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."168 Ultimately, the majority found that the state's interest was not suffi69
ciently compelling to overcome Johnson's rights.1
The majority began its analysis by establishing the first amendment parameters of Johnson: the "bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment . . .is that the government may not prohibit the

expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 170 By protecting the flag as a symbol of na162. Id. "If [Johnson] had burned the flag as a means of disposing of it because it
was dirty or torn, he would not have been convicted of flag desecration under this
Texas law." Id.; see 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1988) (burning is the preferred means of disposing of a flag "when it is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem of
display").
163. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542-43; see, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988).
164. Johnson 109 S. Ct. at 2542; see also supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
165. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
166. Id.
167. Boos, 485 U.S. at 317-18 (noting that "content-based restrictions on political
speech in a public forum .. .must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny").
168. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); accord Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 572
(1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
169. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
170. Id. at 2544; see, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988);

tional unity, the state promoted its own viewpoint about what the
flag should symbolize and denied a person's right to have an opposing
view. 171 For example, Johnson might have seen the flag as a symbol
of repression, not as a symbol of unity. The majority pointed to prior
cases in which statutes with viewpoint preferences have been held
unconstitutional.172
Taking the viewpoint concept a step further, the majority held that
the government cannot prohibit flag burning simply because it finds
the message offensive. 173 The majority looked to the Street and Barnette decisions to support the notion that a state cannot be permitted
to "foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct
1 74
relating to it."'

While the viewpoint argument was obviously' the focal point of the
majority's decision, the Court also employed other arguments in its
analysis. The majority recognized that the Texas statute lacked discernable boundaries to enable courts to determine which symbols
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent; 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65, 72 (1983); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46,
(1978); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
115 (1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968); Brown
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 366, 368-69
(1931).
171. James, Term's Decisions on Expression Confound Many, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 21,
1989, at S6, col. 1 ("The majority appears to be promoting the view ... that while the
rules in free speech may have started as a way of promoting political opinion, (free
speech] is now regarded as a symbol of national tolerance for diverse points of view.").
172. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546 (citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)).
The Schacht Court held that a federal statute which forbids an actor to wear the uniform of the armed forces is unconstitutional if the portrayal discredits that armed
force. The Court held that the government may not ensure that a symbol be used to
express only one view of that symbol or its referents. Schacht, 398 U.S. at 63.
173. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544. But see id. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The
concept of 'desecration' does not turn on the substance of the message the actor intends to convey, but rather on whether those who view the act will take serious offense." Id. (emphasis in original) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
hypothesized that even if a person wanted to convey respect for the flag by publicly
burning it, he would be guilty of the statute if he knew those watching him misperceived his intended message and were seriously offended. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
174. Id. at 2545; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969) ("[T]he constitutionally
guaranteed 'freedom to be intellectually.., diverse or even contrary,' and the 'right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,' encompass the freedom
to express publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which are
defiant or contemptuous." Id. (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
[A] government cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity in its citizens.
Therefore, that very same government cannot carve out a symbol of unity and
prescribe a set of approved messages to be associated with that symbol when it
cannot mandate the status or feeling the symbol purports to represent.
Johnson, 755 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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were sufficiently special to warrant this unique status.175 The court
opined that, without such guidelines, lawmakers might be swayed by
76
political preferences and impose them on the public.1
In addition, the Court noted that the flag has neither a special
place in the Constitution, nor a separate judicial category.177 There
also are many principles that the nation holds sacred-such as the
disdain for racial discrimination-but the first amendment still protects the right of opponents to express their views about these matters. Therefore, the Court declined "to create for the flag an
exception to the joust of principles protected by the First
Amendment."178
The majority expressed the belief that national unity should be fostered by persuasion, not by law. 179 It asserted that dissenters from
national unity should not be punished for differing views.' 8 0 On the
1
contrary, the best remedy is "more speech, not enforced silence."''
Moreover, the majority was convinced that this single gesture of
one unknown man would not change the nation's attitude toward its
flag.182 The Court noted that if burning the flag would incite a
breach of the peace, as Texas asserted, it actually shows that people
would riot to defend the symbol.183 The majority was convinced that
a rally to protect the flag from desecration would demonstrate the
national unity surrounding this symbol and prove that the role of our
84
flag is not in danger.
The majority concluded by asserting that the flag is not consecrated by punishing those who desecrate it.185 "[I]n doing so we di86
lute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents."
2.

Concurring Opinion

In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy apologetically echoed
175. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546.
176. Id.; see also Carey v. Brown, 477 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980).
177. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2547.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
182. Id. (paraphrasing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2547-48.
186. Id. at 2548.

the sentiments of the majority when he wrote, "[S]ometimes we must
make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are
right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see
them, compel the result."187 Justice Kennedy agreed with the dissent that the flag holds a lonely place of honor. 8 8 However, he was
compelled to join with the majority because "[i]t is poignant but fun18 9
damental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt."'
2.

Minority Decisions

a. Dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White
and Justice O'Connor
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not debate the content-neutral or content-based distinctions. He did not discuss which test should apply,
nor did he construct a constitutional framework for his argument.
He went directly to the heart of the matter-the flag itself. In great
detail, the Chief Justice traced the historically unique position that
the American flag has occupied for more than 200 years,19 0 and concluded that this uniqueness justified a governmental prohibition
against flag desecration. 19 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist supported his position with additional arguments. First, he claimed that the government possesses a property
right over the flag and, thus, has a right to control its abuse. 19 2 To
187. Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 2548-2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing 8 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 464 (Ford ed. 1907) (after Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress designated the design of the new flag)); G. PREBLE, HISTORY OF THE
FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 453 (1880) ("The lowering of the American

flag at Fort Sumter was viewed as the start of the Civil War.") Texas v. White, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (after the Civil War, the American flag flew over "an indestructible union, composed of indestructible states"); see also Proclamation No. 2605, 9
Fed. Reg. 1957 (1944), reprintedin 36 U.S.C. § 178 app. at 188 (1988) (President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the use of flags on containers exported for lend-lease aid to
inform people of United States assistance); Hearings Desecration of the Flag, on H.R.
271 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 189 (1967) (Representative L. Mendel Rivers testified that because of the flag
burnings, he was receiving an increase in mail from Vietnam troops asking what was
happening in America); id. (Representative Charles Wiggens stated "[t]he public act of
desecration of our flag tends to undermine the morale of American troops"); 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1481-1482 (1983) (designated that the flag be placed on the casket of a deceased soldier, and then given to his family); 36 U.S.C. § 175(m) (designated that upon the death
of a president, the flag is to be flown at half-mast as a "mark of respect for their memory"); id. § 170 ("Star Spangled Banner" designated as the national anthem); id. § 157
(Congress designated June 14th as Flag Day); Pub. L. 100-186, 101 Stat. 1286 (1988)
(Congress designated "Stars and Stripes Forever" as the national march); 36 U.S.C.
§ 172 (Congress established the "Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag").
191. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The fact that Johnson was not the owner of
the flag is not relevant in this case because he was only prosecuted for desecration, not
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support this claim, he cited San FranciscoArts & Athletics v. United
States Olympic Commission, 9 3 which held that Congress could grant
the exclusive use of the word "Olympic" to the U.S. Olympic Committee which, in turn, had the right to restrict other organizations
from using it.

194

The Court in Olympic Commission reasoned that,

"when a word [or symbol] acquires value 'as a result of organization
and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money' by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word
[or symbol]."19 5 The Chief Justice asserted that under the same reasoning, Congress or the states should be able to obtain a similar interest in the symbol of the flag. 196 "The flag is a national property, and
' 19 7
the nation may regulate... it.
Chief Justice Rehnquist next considered areas of expression which
are unprotected by the first amendment,198 noting that "the First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places."' 99 He
likened Johnson's actions to those in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,200 in which Chaplinsky's "fighting words" 20 1 were not protected because "by their very utterance [they] . . . tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace."202 Applying the Chaplinsky princi-

ples to the present case, the Chief Justice contended that the public
burning of a flag also had the tendency to incite a breach of the
trespass or conversion, The majority emphasized that "nothing in our opinion should
be taken to suggest that one is free to steal a flag so long as one later uses it to communicate an idea." Id. at 2544 n.8.
193. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
194. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
195. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. at 532 (quoting International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)).
196. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
591 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
198. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
199. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Members of
the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (emphasis added)).
200. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
201. Id. at 572. Chaplinsky was convicted for saying to a local Marshall, "[y]ou are
a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." Id. at 569.
202. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 571-72). The Chaplinsky Court further held that "such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-75.

20 3

peace.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also declared that flag burning was not an
essential part of Johnson's expression of ideas since numerous alternatives existed that would be equally effective. 20 4 The statute was
not punishing Johnson because Texas opposed the message he wished
to convey; it opposed only the symbol he used.20 5 Accordingly, Texas
allowed Johnson a "full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form of verbal expression to express his deep disapproval of national policy." 206 Moreover, because there were alternative means of
expression and a probability that his action would cause a breach of
the peace, 207 the state's public interest clearly outweighed the slight
value of permitting Johnson this particular form of expression.
Chief Justice Rehnquist implied that the American flag is not just
another symbol. 208 The government was not responsible for establishing the deep respect people feel for the flag-that was accomplished by 200 years of history.209
The Chief Justice viewed it
inconsistent that a government "may conscript men into the Armed
Forces where they might perhaps die for the flag,. . . [but] may not
prohibit the public burning of the banner under which they fight."210
b.

Justice Stevens's Dissent

Justice Stevens's dissent is remarkable because he avoided the
usual legal analysis in order to view the issues of Johnson from a
broader perspective. He concluded that an intangible dimension existed in flag burning cases which rendered the Court's precedent in
203. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This view also has
been confirmed by the highest courts of several states which have upheld statutes
prohibiting public flag burning because it is so "inherently inflammatory that it may
cause a breach of public order." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., State v. Wa-

terman, 190 N.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Iowa 1971); State v. Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 229, 305 A.2d
676, 680 (1973); see also State v. Mitchell, 32 Ohio App. 2d 16, 30, 288 N.E.2d 216, 226
(1972).
204. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Alternatives available
to Johnson included: public effigies of officials, verbal denunciation, the burning of
other symbols, even burning the American flag privately. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Contrary to this position, the majority points out that the dissent's assertion that
there are equally effective alternatives available to Johnson is inconsistent with the
dissent's other assertion that the flag occupies a unique position in our society. Id. at

2546 n.11. If the flag is unique, messages conveyed without the flag's use cannot be as
forceful. Id.
205. Id. at 2554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
207. In his analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed a "potential" breach of the
peace. Id at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Conversely, the majority required an
"actual" breach of the peace. Id. at 2548.
208. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

209. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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prior first amendment cases inapplicable.211
Justice Stevens reasoned that because the flag is a unique symbol,
the precedent involving a host of other symbols should not apply. 212
Justice Stevens viewed the flag as symbolizing more than "nationhood and national unity." 213 He saw the flag as a "symbol of
freedom, of equal opportunity, of religious tolerance, and of good will
for other peoples who share our aspirations" 214--ideas that character215
ize this society.
In balancing the state's interest in preserving the value of the flag
as a symbol against an individual's first amendment rights, Justice
Stevens found the state's interest sufficiently compelling. He apprehended that "[t]he value of the flag as a symbol cannot be measured" 2 16 and that preserving this value is legitimate and
significant.217 He was unpersuaded by the majority's argument that
the symbol's value will be enhanced by a commitment to free expression.218 Instead, Justice Stevens felt that "sanctioning the public desecration of the flag will tarnish its value." 21 9 Justice Stevens then
considered Johnson's first amendment rights and concluded that his
rights were not unreasonably restricted by this "trivial burden on
free expression" because Johnson's protest easily could have been
satisfied by using another mode of expression, including uttering
220
words critical of the flag.
Justice Stevens contested the majority's opinion that Johnson was
convicted for his "disagreeable ideas." 22 1 Rather, Justice Stevens argued Johnson was convicted for "disagreeable conduct that... diminishes the value of an important national asset." 222 In Justice
Stevens's view, Johnson was prosecuted for the method he selected
to "express his dissatisfaction." 2 23 Yet, Justice Stevens observed, had
211. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens refers to the majority's statement
that "the flag's deservedly cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not
weakened, by our holding today." Id. at 2547.
219. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority's opinion
on this point, see supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
222. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
223. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Johnson expressed his views by spray painting the Lincoln Memorial,
the government could undeniably prohibit that particular means of
expression because of its legitimate interest in preserving an important national asset. 224 Applying this logic to the present case, Justice
Stevens indicated that even though the national asset was intangible,
"the same interest supports a prohibition on the desecration of the
22
American flag." 5
In his conclusion, Justice Stevens concurred with the observations
of Chief Justice Rehnquist that "[t]he ideas of liberty and equality
have been an irresistible force in motivating leaders" 226 of our nation.
"If those ideas are worth fighting for," 2 2 7 then the flag that uniquely
symbolizes their power is certainly "worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration."22s
V.

THE IMPACT OF THE JOHNSON DECISION

Public opinion and legislative responses reveal Texas v. Johnson's
serious impact on the United States. What began as public outrage
has led the executive and legislative branches of government to join
forces in finding ways to circumvent this controversial decision of the
judicial branch. Although the people wanted to make flag desecration' illegal, the Supreme Court said "no," and, thus, elected officials
came up with creative solutions.229 These solutions and their inherent constitutional problems will be discussed in the following analysis
of Johnson's impact. If the solutions can pass Supreme Court muster,
they will set important guidelines for future first amendment
interpretation.
A.

Public Response

While constitutional scholars might have anticipated the Johnson
ruling, 230 the general public did not, and they responded vehemently
against it.231 A Harris poll found that the number of Americans with
224. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. See inkfra notes 238, 246-47 and accompanying text.
230. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 1. Dean Stone testified that "for those who are familiar with the basic precedents and doctrines that have evolved over the past seventy
years, Johnson was hardly surprising. To the contrary, Johnson followed quite sensibly from some of the most basic, most firmly established and most well-reasoned
precepts of American constitutional law." Id.
231. Simpson, Decision Unravels Flag's Very Fabric, INSIGHT, July 24, 1989, at 8.
Americans throughout the country expressed deep distress at the Court's decision. For
example: (1) the City Council in Columbus, Georgia, voted to fly the flag upside down
(a sign of international distress) to protest the decision; (2) the citizens of Findlay,
Ohio, rallied to petition their U.S. Congressional representative to support a constitu-
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"high confidence" in the Supreme Court dropped from twenty-eight
percent to seventeen percent between June and July of 1989.232 In a
poll conducted by Newsweek Magazine, seventy-one percent of the
Americans questioned said that they would support an amendment to
ban flag burning, and sixty-five percent disagreed with the Johnson
decision.233 Eighty-six percent of those surveyed in a regional poll
conducted by the University of Connecticut strongly disapproved of
burning the flag to make a political point, while only four percent
said they approved. 234 A report in the Los Angeles Business Journal
noted that sales of flags in local shops increased significantly soon after the decision. 235 The new commander-in-chief of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars of the United States, armed with a petition containing
one-million signatures, spoke to a Senate Committee seeking a con236
stitutional amendment against desecration of the American flag.

One commentator suggested that the Supreme Court "can best preserve their reputation as experts by avoiding subjects everyone understands."2 37 A significant majority of the American people rallied
tional amendment; (3) four teenagers in Mesa, Arizona, had a barber sculpt the flag
into their hair; (4) country musician Merle Haggard wrote a new, pro-flag song; and (5)
an entrepreneur in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, began selling flags treated with
flame retardant. Id.
232. Guest, The New Supreme Court Term May Disappoint Conservatives, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct: 2, 1989, at 31 n.13 (citing the Harris poll, a national public
opinion survey).
233. Dillon, Bush's Call Sparks Ardent Debate: Defenders of Old Glory May Undermine First Amendment Guarantees, Cautious Voices Warn, Christian Sci. Monitor,
July 6, 1989, at 8, col. 1 (citing the Newsweek poll).
234. Poll Finds Supportfor Flag Amendment, Proprietary to the United Press Int'l,
Aug. 13, 1989 (citing the University of Connecticut's Institute for Social Inquiry poll,
which queried 500 state residents). In the same survey, 64 percent of the people polled
said they opposed the Supreme Court decision, while only 32 percent said they supported it and 4 percent expressed no opinion. The Connecticut survey also found that
"74 percent of the respondents said they believed that flag burning should be against
the law, while 22 percent said it should not. Two percent said that it would depend on
why the flag was burned and 2 percent had no opinion." Id. Fifty-nine percent of
those surveyed supported an amendment to make flag burning a criminal offense, 35
percent opposed such an amendment, and 6 percent had no opinion. Id.
235. Curtis, Burning Issue Ignites Flag Sales, L.A. Bus. J., Aug. 14, 1989, § 1, at 1.
Soon after the Johhson decision, a small storefront shop in Pasadena was jammed with
customers seeking flags. The owner said, "We didn't expect the crowds ... [t]his year
was like the bicentennial." Id.
236. New VFW Head Vows to Fight Flag Desecration, Proprietary to the United
Press Int'l, Sept. 10, 1989 (reporting on Walter G. Hogan, Commander in Chief of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States).
237. Burn, Baby, Burn, FlagBurning Case, 41 NAT'L REV. 13 (1989). "This time the
Justices ventured to contradict plain common sense about a venerated object, and were
greeted with such angry contempt as might greet an archbishop who declared baseball
immoral." Id.

in favor of preserving the flag as a national symbol and, consequently, many of the politicians who represent them did the same.
B.

PoliticalResponse

In a remarkable bipartisan effort, the United States Senate voted
ninety-seven to three to register "profound disappointment" with the
Johnson decision. 23 8 As angry protesters burned judicial robes
outside the Supreme Court, the House of Representatives spoke out
in an all-night session against the ruling. 239 The House and Senate
joined in overwhelmingly passing a resolution condemning the
Court's decision. 240 At the site of the Marine Corps Memorial at the
Arlington National Cemetery, President Bush announced a proposed
constitutional amendment 241 declaring that "this flag is one of our
most cherished ideas." 242 The full legislature in at least five states
passed separate resolutions supporting the amendment, 43 while at
least one chamber in ten other states did the same. 244 Even assem-

blyman Tom Hayden of California, a radical political protester in the
2 45
1960s, voted for the amendment.
Congressional republicans and democrats joined in an effort to protect the flag in a manner that the Supreme Court would find constitutionally acceptable.
The two solutions considered were: (1) a
constitutional amendment, 246 or (2) a new federal -anti-flag burning
statute with wording designed to circumvent the first amendment
problems enunciated in Johnson.247 The constitutional issues raised
by both of these "solutions," and the resulting arguments among
scholars,2 48 demonstrate the broad impact of Texas v. Johnson. The
issue is whether these solutions will be constitutionally acceptable to
a majority of the United States Supreme Court.
238. A Fiery Furor Over the Flag; Why the Court's Decision Was Incendiary, LIFE,
Aug. 1989, at 106.
239. Id.
240. Simpson, supra note 231, at 9.
241. Id. at 12. The text of the proposed amendment is: "The Congress and the
states shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the
United States." Id.

242. Id. at 9.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Crovitz, On the Flag, the Justices Make Dukakis's Mistake, Wall St. J., July 6,
1989, at A12, col. 2. "Anti-war activist Tom Hayden, now a California legislator, last
week voted for a constitutional amendment against flag burning because such actions
incite violence-and he should know." Id.
246. See infra notes 249-69 and accompanying text.
247. See infra notes 270-96 and accompanying text.
248. See inrra notes 253-96 and accompanying text.

[Vol. 17: 757, 1990]

Texas v. Johnson
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

1.

The Amendment:

The constitutional amendment sought by President Bush249 was rejected by the Senate, 2so which decided that an amendment was a radical response. Although they postponed it in favor of a new federal
statute,25 ' the issue is not yet over. If the statute is challenged and
ruled unconstitutional, then the amendment issue probably will be
revived.
A leading proponent of the amendment is former federal Judge
Robert H. Bork. Speaking before the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Judge Bork expressed the view that the flag is the one symbol that stands above
partisan ideological dispute and, as such, should be preserved inviolate.252 "If a multitude of individuals are also to be a community,
they must have symbols by which they live, symbols that express
their identity as a community." 25 3 It was Judge Bork's belief that a
statute would be unconstitutional by the Johnson reasoning 254 and,
therefore, would only delay the amendment process.
The Senate Committee also heard the testimony of other proponents of a constitutional amendment. Stephen B. Presser and ArLynn Leiber Presser 2 5S acknowledged that the Court was compelled
to reach the result it did in Johnson based on the precedent of its
previous first amendment decisions.256 Moreover, such logic probably
would prohibit a neutrally crafted flag desecration statute. 25 7 They
asserted, therefore, that the only way the Johnson result could be
249. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
250. Eaton, Senate Rejects Flag-BurningAmendment, L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at
Al, col. 3. "The 51-48 vote was well short of the two-thirds needed to approve changes
in the Constitution." Id,
251. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, § 1, at 24, col. 1. In a 91 to 9 vote, the Senate overwhelmingly passed a bill making it a federal crime to burn the American flag. Wall St.
J., Sept. 13, 1989, at A20, col. 3 (House of Representatives voted 380 to 38 to approve
the flag burning bill).
252. Bork, Flag Burning Should Be Unconstitutional, Newsday, Aug. 9, 1989,
(Viewpoint), at 63 (testimony of Robert H. Bork, a John M. Olin Scholar in legal studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, before the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.)
253. Id.
254. See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text for Judge Bork's reasoning.
255. S. Presser & A.L. Presser, Rights, Responsibilitiesand the Flag, Chi. Tribune,
Sept. 27, 1989, § C (Perspective), at 19. Stephen B. Presser is a professor at the Northwestern University School of Law, and ArLynn Leiber Presser is a lawyer and freelance writer. They presented their arguments before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
256. Id.
257. Id.

changed was either by a new Supreme Court decision or a constitutional amendment. 258 They supported an amendment because there
are times when concepts of decency and taste-sometimes referred to
as the prejudices of the majority of people-deserve some
2 9
deference. 5
Constitutional scholars opposing the amendment 260 also spoke
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Geoffrey R. Stone, Dean of
the University of Chicago Law School, argued that the Constitution
should not be tampered with because:
[s]uch a practice would clutter, trivialize and, indeed, denigrate the Constitu-

tion and the broad principles for which it stands. We should recognize the
flag issue for what it is-a profoundly controversial and inflammatory dispute
over what in the grand scheme of constitutional government is ultimately a
matter of secondary importance. It does not warrant resort to the most profoundly solemn act2 6 our
nation can pursue-amendment of the Constitution of
1
the United States.

Walter Dellinger argued that the Bill of Rights controls later amendments as well as the original Constitution. 262 For example, even
though the fourteenth amendment was added later, it is constrained
by the first amendment. Thus, the proposed amendment could not
override the first amendment. 263 Professor Dellinger also was concerned that quick resort to an amendment, without sober reflection,
would create a dangerous precedent. 264 "Proposal of this amendment
would dangerously 'lower the threshold' at which amending the Constitution is seen as a proper response to a perceived problem. Not
only dissidents are at risk. Rights like freedom of the press, which
265
now seem secure, would not necessarily be so in the future."
Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of constitutional law at
Harvard Law School, speaking before the House Judiciary Committee, testified that "if a goal may be achieved without constitutional
difficulty through the normal legislative process, surely it is folly to
reach for the heavy artillery of the amending process to achieve that
goal." 266 In a letter to the Editor of the New York Times, 267 Burt
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. A letter signed by 511 constitutional law professors arrived at the office of
Senator Joseph Biden, head of the Judiciary Committee, urging the committee to op-

pose a constitutional amendment. Marcus & Wermeil, Legal Beat, Wall St. J., Sept. 22,
1989, at B6, col. 3.
261. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 2.
262. W. Dellinger, Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Constitutional and Statutory Responses to Texas v. Johnson 8 (Sept. 14, 1989).
Walter Dellinger is a professor of law at Duke University Law School.
263. Id. "Congress may not, for example, exercise its fourteenth amendment
'power' to enforce the equal protection clause by legislation requiring all newspapers
to promote equality daily in their editorials." Id.
264. Id. at 14.
265. Id. at 14-15.
266. L. Tribe, Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on Civil and Con-
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Neuborne, Professor at the New York University School of Law, said
that it was a mistake to "tinker" with the constitution. 268 "[Tihe
First Amendment ain't broke, and attempts to 'fix' it by amending its
meaning are a lot like 'fixing' Shakespeare by taking out the big
269
words."
Ultimately, Congress was persuaded by the arguments of the
amendment's opponents. However, if the statutory solution proves to
be inadequate, it is likely that a renewed debate on the amendment
issue will ensue.
2.

The Statute:

The Texas flag desecration statute had little chance for judicial
success because the Johnson Court judged it by a compelling state interest test. 270 Congress recognized that for a new flag protection statute to withstand the Johnson ruling, it would have to be written so
that, if challenged, it would be judged by the more lenient O'Brien
balancing test.271 Therefore, Congress was obliged to write a statute
that was content-neutral.272 Whether or not Congress succeeded is
debated by the scholars and, ultimately, will be decided by the courts.
For the new statute 273 to be content-neutral, it must be unrelated
to free expression, and neutral with respect to content. The new
statute provides: "Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, burns,
maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the
United States shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for
not more than one year, or both."274 Unlike the Texas law invali-

dated by Johnson, this federal statute makes no reference to "desecration" and does not turn on whether the proscribed conduct "will
seriously offend" others. 275 Dean Stone maintained that the wording
stitutional Rights Concerning Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the Supreme
Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson 18 (July 18, 1989).
267. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1989, at A22, col. 4.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
273. Biden-Roth-Cohen Flag Protections Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (Supp.
1989).
274. Id.
275. The former federal statute punished "[w]hoever knowingly casts contempt
upon any flag of the United States by publicly ... defacing it..
" 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)
(1976). By deleting the "casts contempt" language of the former federal statute, and
replacing it with language extending to anyone who intentionally defaces the flag regardless of his motive, Congress hopes to achieve neutrality. The "contempt" language

of the new legislation is content-neutral because it "applies without
regard to whether the conduct takes place in public or in private,
without regard to whether it is undertaken for expressive or for
other purposes, without regard to whether it offends others, and
without regard to the particular message any individual may seek to
convey." 276 Therefore, Dean Stone concluded that the statute's language is not "directly related to the suppression of free
27 7
expression."
Former federal Judge Robert H. Bork does not believe that the
statute can undo Texas v. Johnson because, no matter how neutrally
worded, "the legislative history of the statute would reveal that it
was designed to prevent the expression of an idea." 2 78 He contended
that Congress could not articulate any reason for the statute other
than to prohibit an act that is an offensive mode of expression. 279
Thus, Judge Bork thinks that a court will recognize that Congress
merely attempted to alter the result of Johnson by changing the statute's wording without changing the intent behind the Code.280
Dean Stone joined with Judge Bork in questioning whether the
government's interest in protecting the physical integrity of the flag
might be directly related to the suppression of free expression,
thereby rendering the neutrally worded statute content-based. 2s1 If
the governmental interest is to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity, then by the reasoning of Street 282 and Spence,283 the law
of the former federal statute caused the statute to be content-based, just as the "seriously offend" language caused the Texas statute to be content-based.
276. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 7; accord L. Tribe, supra note 266, at 5. "The fundamental approach of [the] statute is to treat American flags as the very special objects
they are, and to protect them all from destruction and defacement regardless of any
message the actor might intend to convey." Id.
277. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 7.
278. Flag Desecration and the Constitution; Bork: Desecration Akin to Obscenity,
Indecent Behavior, Legal Times, July 24, 1989, at 17 (testimony of Robert Bork before
the House Judiciary Subcommittee) [hereinafter Bork: DesecrationAkin to Obscenity];
accord Loophole Patriotism; Democrats' Legislative Alternative to 'Flag Burning
Amendment', NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 7, 1989, at 4 [hereinafter Loophole].
But who's kidding whom, Senator Biden? The reason you want to ban flag
burning is that it offends people. It offends you, you say, because the flag 'embodies cherished values.' Burning the flag therefore dissents from those values. You want to ban flag burning because it conveys an offensive messagean offensive political message. Political messages offensive to the majority are
the heart of what the First Amendment protects. It doesn't matter how you
phrase the law.
Id.
279. Bork: DesecrationAkin to Obscenity, supra note 278, at 7. "[Tjhe lawyer defending the statute would be required to articulate a compelling governmental interest. He would be unable to do so since the only governmental interest would be in
preventing flag-burning as a means of expression, and that is precisely what Johnson
held unconstitutional." Id.
280. Id.
281. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 11-12.
282. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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applies only to people who undermine that governmental interest
28 4
with acts which present an inconsistent message.
Dean Stone also addressed Judge Bork's concern for impermissible
legislative motivation 285 by saying that if Congress passed this act as
a "cynical effort to circumvent" Johnson, it might be invalidated by
the Court because it was enacted for constitutionally impermissible
reasons. 28 6 However, Dean Stone indicated that, historically, the
Court has looked to the underlying motivation only in decisions by
the executive and administrative branches of government. 28 7 Thus
far, the Court has been reluctant to inquire into congressional motivation.288 Therefore, although the Bork argument may be valid,
Stone pointed out that the Court may not overturn the new statute
on that basis.289 Thus, the question of the statute's content-neutral
status is subject to debate.
Even if the statute did pass the content-neutral hurdle, it still may
be unconstitutional if its restriction on free expression outweighs the
legitimate governmental interests 290 and, therefore, fails the balancing test. Dean Stone regarded this scenario as unlikely because the
Court uses a very lenient standard of review in applying the balancing test,2 9 1 especially when the restriction leaves!.alternate avenues
283. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
284. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 12. Dean Stone offered another possible governmental interest: to establish the flag as a "venerated object." He likened this interest
to those of religious groups who are permitted to proscribe the desecration of certain
objects without regard to the object's expressive purpose or the)purpose of the person
who defiles it. Id. at 13.
285. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text for Judge Bork's view.
286. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 10.
287. Id. at 10; see, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Court examines racially inspired school board actions); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(Court examines constitutionality of municipal ordinances).
288. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 11.
In O'Brien, for example, the Court, largely for prudential reasons, declined to
inquire into legislative motivation to determine whether the actual purpose of
the draft card statute was not to facilitate the administration of the draft but,
rather, to punish those individuals who opposed the draft: by burning their
draft cards.
Id. at 11; see, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (stating that "inquiries into congressional
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter"). But see Wallace.v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (in the area of religion the Court has invalidated laws because of impermissible legislative motivation).
289. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 10.
290. Id. at 8; see, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1943) (government's interest
in reducing litter is insufficient to outweigh an individual's first amendment right to
distribute leaflets in public).
291. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

for the speaker to express his message. 292 For instance, in United
States v. O'Brien, the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the
knowing destruction or mutilation of a draft card when O'Brien
burned his draft card as a political protest. 293 The Court found that
the statute passed the balancing test because the protester could express his views by other means and the statute reasonably furthered
an important governmental interest. 294 Dean Stone suggested that if
"the government's interest in protecting the physical integrity of the
American flag is similarly substantial to the governmental interest" 29 5 in O'Brien, and "if the proposed [flag] legislation is understood to be content-neutral and unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, [then] it too would in all likelihood withstand content'
neutral review. "296
There are numerous "if's" in Dean Stone's analysis which would
create problems in using O'Brien to anticipate what might happen
when the new flag protection statute is challenged. In O'Brien, it is
quite possible that the government's stated interest in the smooth
functioning of the draft system was only a cover-up for the real purpose of the law: to punish protesters who burned their draft cards.
However, the government at least was able to come up with a neutral
interest. Conversely, under the present federal flag desecration statute, the government might have a hard time claiming an important
interest, real or feigned, which can be divorced from expressive conduct. Thus, an analogy with O'Brien might prove ineffective.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Texas v. Johnson is predicated on well-established law interpreting
the first amendment. Legal scholars who understand the complicated theories behind content-based and content-neutral distinctions
realize the importance of this established precedent. But the average
person, who does not understand complex constitutional matters, responds with his heart. Some people join with the majority's view of
first amendment rights. As one commentator exclaimed, "Is there no
one eloquent enough to make people weep with gratitude that we
297
live in a country where people are free enough to burn the flag?"
At the same time, others are more responsive to Justice Stevens's argument that the flag is more than an object, it is a symbol that cannot be measured in tangible terms. Trying to express his feelings
about the flag, a retired Special Forces officer sitting near the black
292. G. Stone, supra note 16, at 9.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968).
Id. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
G. Stone, supra note 16, at 10.
Id.
Loophole, supra note 278, at 4.
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granite wall of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial said, "It's very hard
to explain. It's like electricity: You can see the results but you can't
see the electricity. Know what I mean? It's a nontangible item
which is a thought; it's within your heart. I was brought up that
way." 298 One teen-age student wrote in the "Students Speak Out"
column in the Washington Post:299
Anyone who disregards the significance of the flag and what it stands for
should not be allowed to rob the country of its symbol. Burning the flag is
disrespectful. This crime demeans what our country has worked for so diligently since the founding. If I were the president and had the authority to
punish those who commit what is to me an unjustified and ungrateful act, I
would not only exile them from the United
States, but I would also make sure
30 0
that they receive psychiatric evaluation.

Flag desecration is not an ordinary first amendment issue. Judging
from the polls taken and the vociferous public outcry, many feel that
a flag burning statute constitutes one of the rare times when the government's interest is significant enough to outweigh an individual's
right of free expression-by any test.3 01 Thus, it would appear that
the average person embraces Justice Stevens's view: this is one circumstance in which a logical application of first amendment precedent is not appropriate because of the intangible dimension and
symbolic significance of the American flag.
EPILOGUE

The Biden-Roth-Cohen Flag Protection Act of 1989 went into effect at 12:01 a.m. on Saturday, October 28, 1989.302 The next day,
flags were burned in protest all over the nation, but no arrests were
made. 30 3 Finally, on October 30, 1989, a group chanting "burn, baby,
burn," set fire to a flag in front of the Capitol building in Washington, D.C. They were the first to be arrested under the new statute.30 4
Now the scholarly debate surrounding the constitutionality of the
new federal statute will be resolved by an actual judicial challenge.
298. Simpson, supra note 231, at 8.
299. Students Speak Out: What is Your Opinion of the Supreme Court's Decision
on Flag Burning?, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1989, at J9.
300. Id.
301. See supra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
302. Protestors Defy New Anti-Desecration Law, Flag Burns, L.A. Times, Oct. 29,
1989, at A26, col. 1. President Bush allowed the bill to become law without his signature, still preferring .a constitutional amendment. Bush Allows Flag Law, Won't Sign
It, L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at P2, col. 3.
303. L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at A26, col. 1-2.
304. L.A. Daily News, Oct. 31, 1989, at A13, col. 2.

And who was among those arrested on the Capitol building steps?
30 5
That Johnson boy.
PATRICIA LOFTON

305. Id.

